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ABSTRACT 
 
The Constitution of Kosovo has established a number of mechanisms for 
the separation of powers and reciprocal checks and balances among which is 
the President’s authority to return legislation for reconsideration. However, 
the interaction between the President and the Assembly on matters 
confronting the legislative veto has unveiled a number of constitutional 
ambiguities and inconsistencies which rendered involvement of the 
Constitutional Court necessary to define further the constitutionally-
contemplated powers of the President for returning legislation for 
reconsideration. The article analyses the Presidential legislative veto from the 
prospect of the 2008 Kosovo Constitution. Through constitutional 
interpretation and practical cases this article seeks to examine more closely 
the structural and the functional aspect of the Presidential legislative return 
statements in post-status Kosovo. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the striking features of the Kosovo Constitution is the principle of 
the separation of powers between the legislative, executive and the judicial 
branch. The separation of powers serves at least two essential functions in this 
new democracy. First, it aims to ensure that the power sharing is appropriately 
divided and balanced among the three branches of government, and second, 
that the exercise of the power is reciprocally checked and controlled on the 
basis of the checks and balances principle. One of these balancing powers is 
the right of the President of the Republic to veto legislation enacted by the 
Assembly of Kosovo (hereinafter “Assembly”) if the President (hereinafter 
“the President”) determines that the enacted legislation is constitutionally 
suspect or violates substantial state or national interests. To some scholars, the 
* Prof. Dr. Visar Morina is a lecturer of constitutional law at the University of 
Prishtina in Kosovo and member of the Steering Committee of the Kosovo Chamber 
of Advocates. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Brian Anderson who 
has provided insightful comments for this article.  
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President’s right to return parliamentary-enacted laws for reconsideration is 
nothing but a mere constitutional shield of the community rights. Some argue, 
however, that the President’s legislative veto is a reflection of the checks and 
balances embodied in article 4 of the 2008 Kosovo Constitution. The 
occasional use of the Presidential legislative veto, however, has attracted wide 
attention among the legal community in Kosovo. With the growing legislative 
initiatives, the public and civil society organisations have occasionally called 
upon the President to block legislative attempts that were considered to be 
incompatible with constitutional norms. The President’s legislative veto and 
procedure for its override by the Assembly was also subject of the Kosovo 
Constitutional Court, which testifies the importance of this legislative 
instrument in this new democracy. Considering the above-mentioned 
challenges, this article undertakes a broader legal analysis of the application 
of the President’s right to return legislation from the perspective of the 
Kosovo Constitution. As such, it will complement the existing academic 
literature on two major accounts. First, this article strives to supplement the 
academic discourse regarding the presidential powers in the legislative review 
prior to law promulgation, which remains relatively scant on this important 
subject. Second, this article will fill the gap in the current literature regarding 
certain structural aspects that are generally not addressed by constitutional 
norms but which normally require further legal elaboration regarding the 
interaction between the legislative and the executive branch on law 
promulgation in the parliamentary-type of governments.  
Following the introduction, this article will initially analyse the powers of 
the President in the context of the 2008 Kosovo Constitution. Section 3 of the 
article outlines the process of legal drafting in Kosovo while in section 4 
focus turns to a critical examination of the constitutional interaction between 
the President and the Assembly in accommodating the presidential concerns 
over the enacted legislation. This part of the article seeks to demarcate the 
boundaries of the Presidential review of law-enactments prior to their 
promulgation focusing on both constitutionally enumerated and self-implied 
categories within parameters contemplated by the Kosovo Constitution. After 
having explored the application of the legislative veto in both procedural and 
substantive grounds, section 5 will focus on the challenges and constraints 
which the respective constitutional bodies in Kosovo have encountered in 
dealing with a presidential legislative veto and its legal implications to the 
overall legal drafting process.   
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2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COMPETENCIES OF THE PRESIDENT 
 
As one of the latest constitutions in a world, the 2008 Kosovo Constitution 
follows patterns of modern constitutions by following the concept of power-
division and human rights protection to limit the potential power abuse of the 
governmental institutions. The Constitution provides for an extensive list of 
constitutional rights and freedoms (Chapter 2 of the Constitution) and 
provides for a direct application of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols 
(Arts 22 and 53 of the Constitution). It is also worth pointing out that the 
Constitution has devoted a special chapter to the community rights, which 
contains specific rights for the members of the non-majority communities in 
addition to the human rights provided in chapter 2 of the Constitution. The 
principle of the separation of powers, which now enjoys wide acceptance in 
modern constitutional democracies, is therefore one of the key principles 
entrenched in the Kosovo Constitution.1 The Constitution in its article 4 
provides that “Kosovo is a democratic Republic based on the principle of 
separation of powers and the checks and balances among them as provided in 
this Constitution.” The 120 member Assembly is entitled to exercise the 
legislative power while the President of the Republic represents the unity of 
the people.2 The judicial power is vested with the courts while the 
Constitutional Court is empowered to conduct constitutional review and make 
binding constitutional interpretations.3 The nine-member Constitutional Court 
is entitled to engage in the so-called abstract review of constitutionality and 
serves as a final protector of the constitutional rights and freedoms.  
However, as powers allocated to each branch of the Government are not 
“hermetically” sealed from one another and to ensure that the constitutional 
powers are allocated equally, the Kosovo Constitution has introduced the 
principle of checks and balances where the authority of one organ is 
controlled and checked by the authority of the other organ. Some of those 
reciprocal controls and the constitutional choices are typical for a 
parliamentary type of government. For example, the President of the Republic 
is elected by two thirds (2/3) majority of all deputies of the Assembly, but the 
1 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo was proclaimed on 9 April 2008 and entered 
into force 15 June 2008 (Constitution). For more on the Kosovo Constitution see 
Joseph Marko, ‘The new Constitution of Kosovo from the regional perspective’ 
(2008) 33 Review of Central and European Law 437; John Tunheim, “Rule of Law 
and the Kosovo Constitution” (2009) 18 Minnesota Journal of International Law 371; 
Arsim Bajrami, Sistemi Kushtetues i Republikës së Kosovës (2011) Artini.  
2 Constitution (n 1) art 64 and 84. 
3 Constitution (n 1) art 102 and 112. 
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President can dissolve the Assembly following a successful vote of no 
confidence against the Government.4 Similarly, the majority of deputies of the 
Assembly adopt laws, decisions and other acts, but the President is entitled to 
return a law to the Assembly by stating the reasons of return. These reciprocal 
checks are inevitable for a balanced institutional interaction among state 
institutions, which using Carolan reflections on the separation of powers 
indicate that “the extensive powers exercised by the organs of the state could 
never be satisfactorily reduced to a simplistic three-way of allocation of 
tasks.”5 Presidential competencies are contemplated by Article 84 of the 
Constitution. However, as will be seen in the following section of this article, 
the President is independent to discharge only certain constitutional 
competencies; other powers of the President are either shared with or depend 
on the authority of other constitutional bodies.6 
 
The President initiates decision of another organ: The Constitution has 
introduced certain constitutional choices in which the President only initiates 
the decision of another constitutional body but the President is prevented from 
the authority to decide the matter on his own. For example the President is 
competent to initiate a procedure for compliance of a law with the 
Constitution but the final decision rests ultimately with the Constitutional 
Court.7 Likewise, the President may initiate the procedure to have an enacted 
law be reconsidered by the Assembly prior to its promulgation but the 
Assembly’s repeated enactment of a law enables the law to enter into force in 
absence of President’s endorsement.8 It should be noted that these kind of 
constitutional choices are common for some parliamentary-type constitutions 
in the European level in order to keep the constitutional balance of power 
intact. 
 
The President’s decision ratifies the decision of another organ: In addition 
to above, the Constitution has foreseen other limitations in the constitutional 
authority of the President to prevent the President from exercising independent 
constitutional competencies. These limitations have particularly been 
introduced to safeguard and protect the independence of the judiciary, 
including that of the Constitutional Court, where a decision of the President 
4 Constitution (n 1) art 82 para 2. 
5 Eoin Carolan, The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern State (OUP, 
2009) 19. 
6 This categorisation of the competencies of the President has been borrowed from the 
Judgment of the Hungarian Constitutional Court No. 48/1991 on Presidential Powers 
(1991). 
7 Constitution (n 1) art 113 para 2. 
8 Constitution (n 1) art 84 para 6. 
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depends on the authority of the organ and, as such, the President is not 
permitted to exercise a particular function on his own initiative. Examples of 
these are where the President under Article 84 (15) and (16) of the 
Constitution appoints and dismisses the President of the Supreme Court and 
other Judges under the proposal of the Kosovo Judicial Council. The reading 
of the respective articles of the Constitution clearly implies that the President 
is authorised to take a decision for the appointment or dismissal of regular 
judges only based upon a reasoned proposal of the Kosovo Judicial Council. It 
is also assumed that the President is not allowed to appoint a candidate not 
included on the list submitted by the Kosovo Judicial Council for 
appointment. Also under Article 84 (17) and (18) of the Constitution the 
President appoints and dismisses the Chief Prosecutor and prosecutors upon 
the proposal of the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council. What remains unclear from 
a constitutional point of view is whether the constitutional concept of the 
President’s power of appointment includes the right to refuse the appointment. 
In general, it may be considered that the President is bound to accept the 
choice of the nominated person, and may reject the proposed candidate on 
very exceptional grounds if he/she has well founded convictions that such 
appointment might seriously disturb the democratic functioning of the state 
organisations as provided by art. 84.2 of the Constitution. 
 
President’s decision is decisive: The category of independent presidential 
competencies comprises those competencies that are attributable to the 
President by the Constitution and are considered sole constitutional 
responsibilities. The President is entitled to exercise these constitutional 
powers independently from other constitutional organs, and the decision of 
the President is decisive. For example, under Article 69.4 of the Constitution 
the President may convene an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly of 
Kosovo. Further, under Article 139 of the Constitution the President appoints 
the Chairperson of the Central Elections Commission from among the Judges 
of the Supreme Court. The President may also take independent political 
decisions also when serious disturbances in the State’s democratic functioning 
require his intervention. With such intervention the President fulfils his duties 
set out in Article 84 (2) of the Constitution “guarantees the constitutional 
functioning of the institutions set forth by this Constitution.” According to the 
Constitution such cases may arise if the government cannot be established 
within 60 days from the date when the President of the Republic appoints the 
candidate for Prime Minister. In this case the President dissolves the 
Parliament while simultaneously setting the date for new elections. 
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3. THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 
 
Having explored the constitutional competences of the President, we will 
now turn to elaborate in broader terms the legislative process in Kosovo. It 
should be mentioned, however, that not much has been written in this field in 
Kosovo except some documents and guidelines published by the government 
from time to time. These guidelines were published as an effort to increase the 
legal drafting capacities in Kosovo, in particular when it comes to the process 
of converting governmental policies into legal drafting instruments, and 
ensuring compliance with European Union legislation. The right to legislative 
initiative is given to the President of the Republic of Kosovo, the 
Government, deputies of the Assembly or at least ten thousand citizens.9 It 
should be noted that the President can exercise the right to initiate legislation 
only within the ambit of its constitutional authority. Such was the case with 
the Law on the President and the Law on Pardon.10 Obviously, the power to 
initiate drafting of legislation is mainly used by the Government, which 
implements the parliamentary approved program through the enactment of 
legislation whereas legal drafting initiatives by the Assembly of Kosovo have 
been rarely undertaken.11 
The procedure for the referral of legislative initiatives and the procedure 
for the presentment of the draft laws for parliamentary scrutiny are further 
regulated by the Law on the Legislative Initiative and the Rules of Procedure 
of the Assembly of Kosovo.12 The initiating authority is obliged to send the 
announcement for the commencement of the initiative to appropriate table 
unit at the Assembly, requiring provision of detailed explanation as to the 
objectives aimed to be implemented.13 The initiating authority should provide 
an explanation note stating the objectives that are aimed to be achieved and 
the declaration on the potential budgetary implications of the draft law for the 
9 Constitution (n 1) art 79. 
10 Law no. 03/l-101 on Pardon was adopted on 12 December 2008 and was 
promulgated by the Decree No. DL-076-2008 dated 30.12.2008. The Law on the Law 
No. 03/L-094 was adopted on 19 December 2008 and was promulgated by the Decree 
No. DL-082-2008, dated 07.01.2009. 
11 One of a few legal drafting initiatives that were undertaken by the Assembly 
include the Law on the Rights and Obligations of the Deputies of the Assembly of 
Kosovo, the Law on Mines and Minerals and the Law on Pension Fund. 
12 Law on Legislative Initiative No 04/L-025 was approved by the Assembly of 
Kosovo on 6 October 2011. The Law is available at the Official Gazette of Kosovo 
http://gazetazyrtare.rks-gov.net/.  
13 Law on Legislative Initiative, art 13. 
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first three years. Furthermore, a declaration of the approximation and 
harmonisation of the proposed law with EU legislation is also required.14 
Once presented to the Assembly, the draft law is subject to the first 
reading (discussion and voting of the draft law in principle), which takes place 
no earlier than two working weeks and no later than four working weeks, 
from the day of the distribution of the draft law to the members of the 
Assembly.15 The first reading of the draft law commences with its 
presentation by the sponsor, and continues with presentations by the 
rapporteur of the functional committee, representatives of parliamentary 
groups and members of the Assembly.16 A voting in principle concludes the 
first reading. Following the approval of the draft law in the first reading, the 
Assembly assigns for further review one of the Functional Committees as lead 
committee and the main Committees.17 The leading committee reviews all 
submitted amendments and decides whether to take them into consideration 
when preparing a new text of the draft law. Amendments to the draft law may 
be introduced by a Member of the Assembly, parliamentary group, 
parliamentary committee, and the government, within two working weeks 
from the approval in principle. The second reading commences with a 
presentation of the report of the leading committee. Once the report is 
presented, representatives of main committees, representatives of 
parliamentary groups, representatives of the Government and members of the 
Assembly are entitled to discuss and present comments regarding the 
proposed amendments.18 The second reading of draft law continues by a 
review and voting on the proposed amendments to be followed with an 
adoption of the draft law in its entirety.19 It should be noted that when a draft 
law does not receive the sufficient number of votes for its adoption in the 
second reading, the Assembly upon the request of the sponsor of the draft law 
can decide to present the draft law to a third reading together with the adopted 
amendments.20 However, those amendments that were rejected in the second 
reading or those the content of which is similar with amendments of the 
14 Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Kosovo, art 54 (Rules of Procedure). 
15 Rules of Procedure (n 14) art 56 para 2. 
16 Rules of Procedure (n 14) art 56 para 4. 
17 Rules of Procedure (n 14) art 57 para 1. The main Committees include: the 
Committee for Legislation and Judiciary; the Committee for Budget and Finance; the 
Committee for European Integrations; the Committee for Human Rights; Gender 
Equality, Missing Persons and Petitions; and the Committee for Rights and Interests 
of Communities and Returns. 
18 Rules of Procedure (n 14) art 58 para 1. 
19 Rules of Procedure (n 14) art 58. 
20 Rules of Procedure (n 14) art 58. 
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second reading cannot not be presented for the third reading.21 The law 
adopted by the Assembly is signed by the Chairman of the Assembly within 
ten working days from the day of its adoption, following which is sent to the 
President of the Republic for promulgation.22 
The legislative drafting process is concluded when the President 
promulgates a law, which occurs within 8 days from the receipt of a law. But 
a law enters into force fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo except when otherwise specified by the 
law itself.23 This is of course only a general description of the main phases of 
the law drafting process in Kosovo, which may be considered to have been 
sufficiently regulated in Kosovo by way of laws and regulations. But the 
legislative process yet remains a complex undertaking and is often considered 
to be a challenge for drafting authorities in Kosovo to deliver qualitative 
legislative products. Linguistic ambiguity, legal inconsistency and sometimes 
lack of big-picture policy considerations still compromise legislative integrity. 
In this regard, better communication and cooperation between the three 
branches of the government needs to be fostered to ensure unification of legal 
drafting techniques and streamline the law making process at all levels. In 
particular, it is of great importance for the drafting authorities in Kosovo to 
pay more attention to the policy analysis before the drafting of legislation 
begins. This is essential to ensure a well-drafted and properly implemented 
law in a longer run.   
 
4. LEGISLATIVE VETO: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
 
Although the Constitution does not employ the specific term “veto”, the 
content of article 84 para. 6 of the Constitution clearly suggests that the 
President has the right to temporarily prevent entry into force of a law enacted 
by the Assembly if it considers that a law is harmful to the legitimate interests 
of Kosovo or one or more Communities.24 This structural arrangement 
21 Rules of Procedure (n 14) art 59 para 2. 
22 Rules of Procedure (n 14) art 61 paras 1-2. 
23 Constitution (n 1) art 80 para 6. 
24 Constitution (n 1) art 84 para 6. For more on presidential legislative veto in the 
general context see Chad Eggspuehler, ‘The S-Words Mightier than the Pen: Signing 
Statements as Express Advocacy of Unlawful Action’ [2007/2008] 41 Gonz. L. Rev. 
461; Courtney Odishaw, “Curbing Legislative Chaos: Executive Choice or 
Congressional Responsibility?” [1998] 74 Iowa L. Rev 277; Michael Rappaport, ‘The 
President's Veto and the Constitution’ [1992] 87 Nw. U.L. Rev. 736; Aaron Zibart, 
“Eulogizing the Line Item Veto Act: Clinton v City of New York and the Wisdom of 
Presidential Legislating” [1999/2000] 88 Ky. L.J. 505; Sofia Biller, “Flooded by the 
Lowest Ebb: Congressional Responses to Presidential Signing Statements and 
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suggests that the Constitution has provided for a qualified negative legislative 
veto, whose exercise depends on the grounds contemplated by the 
Constitution. There are two structural grounds for vetoing legislation that are 
implicit in the Constitution. The rather broad conceptual framework of 
protection of legitimate interests of the Republic, and the specific adherence 
to the protection of the community interests. With regard to the latter, the 
reasons of the Constitution emphasising the importance of protecting the 
Community interests from parliamentary legislative encroachments are 
worthy of explanation. The President’s involvement for the protection the 
interests of the Communities in the course of the legislative activities 
originate from the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government 
Institutions in Kosovo, which provided:25 
 
“Within 48 hours from the approval of a law by the Assembly 
pursuant to paragraphs 9.1.37 or 9.1.38 above, any member of the 
Assembly, supported by five additional members, may submit a 
motion to the Presidency claiming that the law or certain of its 
provisions violate vital interests of the Community to which he 
belongs. The motion shall set out a reasoned explanation of the 
claimed violation. A motion may be made on the grounds that the law 
or provisions discriminate against a Community, adversely affect the 
rights of the Community members under Chapters 3 or 4, or otherwise 
seriously interfere with the ability of the Community to preserve, 
protect or express its ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic identity.” 
 
However, as Bieber argues commenting the exercise of the veto powers in 
the Bosnia, Kosovo and FYROM, the Constitutional Framework in fact gave 
“only Serbs, and not the other small communities the possibility of delaying 
legislation” given the fact that the Constitutional Framework gave Serbs ten 
guaranteed seats in the Assembly.26 This means that only a majority of Serbs 
were able to challenge the law enacted by the Assembly. The protection of the 
rights and interest of the communities by presidential veto was further 
developed by the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, 
which authorised the President of Kosovo to “return once to the Assembly for 
Executive Hostility to the Operation of Checks and Balances” [2008] 93 Iowa L. Rev. 
1067; George Tsebelis, “Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary 
Democracies: An Empirical Analysis” [1999] 93 The American Political Science 
Review, 591. 
25 Constitutional Framework for the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in 
Kosovo 2001 s 9(1)(39). 
26 Sid Noel, From power sharing to democracy: post conflict institutions in ethnically 
divided societies (McGill Queens University Press, 2005) 96. 
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reconsideration any bill he considers detrimental to the legitimate interests of 
one or more Communities.”27 Hence the Constitution has virtually borrowed 
the exact formulation of the Comprehensive Proposal in giving the President 
the legislative veto powers. Today the legislative veto constitutes an 
appropriate mechanism in the hands of communities to safeguard their rights 
and interests against constitutionally suspect legislation or parliamentary 
omnipotence.  
The right to return legislation serves essential constitutional functions. 
First, the President’s authority to return constitutionally objectionable laws 
enables the President to have a share on the legislative process representing 
the unity of the people. In this representative capacity “the President’s most 
important role is to stave off legislation that might be improved or put aside 
upon more mature and sedate reflection.”28 Second, the occasional use of the 
right to return the adopted law for parliamentary reconsideration enables the 
President to “contribute to the national constitutional dialogue and thus play a 
more active role in the scheme of constitutional deliberation.”29 The 
Presidential engagement in the review of adopted law reinforces the 
conception that it is not only the courts being engaged in the review of 
constitutionality of legislation. As Professor Broughton argues “too often, 
constitutional deliberation is distorted by the mistaken notion that the courts 
are, or should be the exclusive expositors of the Constitution.”30 As some 
constitutional scholars have argued only a popularly elected President could 
serve as the “guardian of the constitution.”31 That said, constitutional 
deliberation would not be considered alien to other political branches, in 
particular for a President acting as “pouvoir neuter” in parliamentary 
democracy promoting the constitutional dialogue as a “key element of the 
President’s role as constitutional deliberator and interpreter outside the 
judiciary.”32 As the US Supreme Court recalled in the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha case: 
 
“the President's participation in the legislative process was to protect 
the Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people 
27 Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement, UN Doc 
S/2007/168/Add.1. 
28 Gary Gregg, The Presidential Republic: Executive Representation and Deliberative 
Democracy (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997) 70. 
29 R Broughton, “Rethinking the Presidential Veto” (2005) 42 Harvard Journal on 
Legislation 91.  
30 Broughton (n 29) 91. 
31 On the role of the President as a guardian of the constitution see Carl Schmitt, Der 
Hüter der Verfassung, (Duncker & Humblot; 1996). 
32 Broughton (n 29) 91. 
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from improvident laws. The division of the Congress into two 
distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be 
exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate 
settings.”33 
 
A textual reading of the Kosovo Constitution provides three constitutional 
avenues from which the President can depart in the course of the review of 
legislation prior to its promulgation. The first constitutional option would be if 
the President decides to sign a law within eight (8) days from the date of its 
reception at the Office of the President. This was and still is the typical 
approach of the presidential leadership in Kosovo. The President can simply 
wait and do nothing within the eight days period, and the law does enter into 
force ex officio without the President’s promulgating act.34 The third option 
happens to be if the President would choose to return a law by stating written 
objections to the Assembly. The exercise of the President’s power to return a 
law for reconsideration is subject to the following constitutional requirements 
which I will briefly analyse below. 
 
The presentment clause 
 
The requirement of the Kosovo Constitution that all adopted laws be 
presented to the President for promulgation is constitutionally unambiguous. 
Presentment of the approved law to the President for promulgation is clearly 
provided by the Constitution: “Laws adopted by the Assembly are signed by 
the President of the Assembly of Kosovo and promulgated by the President of 
the Republic of Kosovo upon her/his signature within eight (8) days from 
receipt.”35 
According to the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Kosovo the laws 
adopted by the Assembly are initially signed by the Chairman of the 
Assembly within 10 working days from the day of its adoption, following 
which are forwarded to the President of the Republic for promulgation.36 
However, there is one exception to this general rule and that is when a law, 
after being returned by the President based on the grounds specified by the 
Constitution, is approved by the Assembly. Such circumstances of course 
render it unnecessary for the Chairman of the Assembly to present the 
approved law to the President for promulgation since the approved law is 
considered automatically promulgated once voted by the Assembly.  
 
33 INS v Chadha (1983) 462 US 919.  
34 Constitution (n 1) art 80 para 5. 
35 Constitution (n 1) art 80 para 2. 
36 Rules of Procedure (n 15) art 61. 
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The exercise of the right of referral only once. 
 
Another limitation of the President’s vetoing powers is encountered in 
Article 84 para. 6 of the Constitution, which defines in clear terms that the 
President’s right for the referral of a law back to Assembly may be exercised 
only once. The one-time presidential veto is typical for power-sharing 
democracies to ensure that parliaments would not be prevented from 
discharging their legislative powers. It is obvious that the President’s veto 
power is not only to rubberstamp parliamentary legislative enactments. The 
one-time exercise of the veto right is a sufficient mechanism to prevent 
navigation of improper legislation. The qualified veto power enables the 
President to state objections to the law by fostering debate and further 
discussion on the contested points of a law. The Presidential intervention in 
the legislative process is basically to enable the President to protect his 
constitutional powers in the constitutional democracy and as Hamilton has 
commented to “counter the passage of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, 
or design.”37 What Hamilton meant by “bad laws” is not sufficiently clear but 
as Professor Broughton argued “his meaning of a bad law is not entirely clear 
on its face […] but it can be deduced that Hamilton meant to refer to 
something other than a law that aggrandises congressional power at the 
expense of the Executive.”38 Although it may be considered that the use of the 
presidential veto only once constitutes a weak and an ineffective tool in the 
hands of the President to oppose the legislative attempts of the government, 
such an instrument is certainly an effective way to prevent the legislature from 
passing laws that may endanger the legitimate interests of Kosovo. Clearly in 
multi-party systems that are characterised with politically-fragmented 
parliaments, attaining the absolute parliamentary majority to overturn a 
decision of the President is often a difficult undertaking. But, even if it does, 
the President can still temporarily block the government’s legislative attempt 
in the Assembly by contesting the enacted law before the Constitutional Court 
for the lack of compatibility with the Constitution.   
 
The timeframe for the review of a law. 
 
The deadline for the review and signing of the laws after their enactment 
by the Assembly is another constitutional constraint in the exercise of the 
Presidential legislative veto. According to Article 84 para 6 of the 
Constitution, the President has 8 (eight) days at its disposal to sign the law 
enacted by the Assembly from the date of its receipt. There is no question that 
37Alexander Hamilton “The Federalist no. 73” in the R Broughton, “Rethinking the 
Presidential Veto” (2005) 42 Harv. J. on Legis. 105. 
38 Ibid. 
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the Constitution has followed the patterns of some regional constitutions, 
which have introduced similar timeframes to prevent unreasonable delays on 
part of the President when reviewing legislation prior to its promulgation. The 
question is, however, whether the eight (8) day period is sufficient to conduct 
a thorough legislative review. Let us first see how the timeframe of the 
legislative review has been addressed in some constitutions. For example, 
according to the Czech Constitution, “the President of the Republic has the 
right to return an adopted law, except a constitutional law, giving reasons, 
within fifteen days of the day of its transmission to the Presidency.”39 The 
Greek Constitution has given the President one month to review and 
promulgate the law voted by the Parliament, which is a period significantly 
lengthier than that compared to the Kosovo Constitution.40 These examples 
demonstrate that the assigned timeframe for the review of laws after their 
enactment by the Assembly is significantly longer than that provided by the 
Kosovo Constitution. In Kosovo, however, although it may seem that the 
timeframe for a review of laws prior to their promulgation is reasonable, the 
actual workload at the President’s Legal Office shows that the eight (8) day 
period may not be sufficient to allow a detailed scrutiny of the enacted 
legislation.41 It is useful to recall that certain laws, due to their size and 
complexity, may require extra time and human efforts to be properly 
scrutinized prior to their promulgation by the President. Another difficulty is 
that the President’s Office is sometimes confronted with a dynamic legislative 
activity of the Assembly, which is obvious for the country’s efforts to join the 
European Union. In such circumstances, the timeframe for review of 
legislation could not be sufficient to enable the legal team to conduct a 
vigilant and structural review of the laws enacted by the Assembly. Therefore, 
as the President is not entitled to extend the timeframe set by the Constitution 
for the review of laws enacted by the Assembly, it may be assumed that the 
only possible way to ensure a longer legislative review timespan is by way of 
constitutional amendments. And, speaking about constitutional amendments, 
it should be noted that the 2008 Kosovo Constitution will most likely undergo 
some major changes in a near future since certain constitutional norms have 
resulted to be too ambiguous to enable proper functioning of constitutional 
bodies (such is the case with article 95 regarding the process of nominating 
39 Constitution of Czech Republic, art 50. For an overview of the constitutional 
practices of the referral of a law back to parliament by the head of states see the 
Venice Commission Report on the referral of a law back to parliament by the head of 
state adopted by the Venice Commission at its 29th session (15-16 November 1996).  
40 Constitution of Greece, art 42. 
41Interview with the Head of the Legal Department of the Office of the President and 
Lecturer of Law at the University of Prishtina (Faculty of Law) Xhafer Tahiri. 
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the candidate for Prime Minister and article 67 regarding the election of the 
Chairman of the Assembly).  
 
The President is not entitled to propose amendments. 
 
A recent judgment of the Kosovo Constitutional Court has firmly 
established that the President is not entitled to come up with his own 
amendments in the course of the review of the legislation adopted by the 
Assembly.42 A few words about the judgment are important here. On 15 
March 2012, the Assembly adopted the Law No. 04L-084 on Pension of the 
members of Kosovo Security Forces [hereinafter as “Law on Pensions of KSF 
members”] and sent it to the President for promulgation as provided by the 
Constitution. On 3 April 2012 the President refused to sign the Law and 
decided to send it back to the Assembly for reconsideration. In its legislative 
return statement the President proposed insertion of a new article in the Law 
in order to ensure compliance with International Monetary Fund obligations 
and enable Kosovo to receive financial support in a form of soft loans or 
technical assistance.43 On its session held on 3 May 2012, the Assembly 
refused to incorporate the President’s proposal, and the Law on Pensions of 
KSF members was declared as promulgated. The President contested the 
constitutionality of the voting of the Law on Pensions of KSF members after 
its return to the Assembly for reconsideration and claimed that Presidential 
competencies to return legislation for reconsideration were violated.44 The 
Constitutional Court initially assessed whether the President of the Republic, 
when returning the law for parliamentary reconsideration has the right to 
propose amendment to returned law “without challenging the adopted law or 
42President Jahjaga v Assembly of Kosovo [2012] KO 57/12 1 (CC). For more on the 
operation and jurisprudence of the Kosovo Constitutional Court see Enver Hasani/P 
Paczolay/M Riegner, Constitutional Justice in South East Europe. Constitutional 
Courts in Kosovo, Serbia, Albania and Hungary between Ordinary Judiciaries and 
the European Court of Human Rights (Nomos/GIZ, 2012); Visar Morina, “The Newly 
Established Constitutional Court in Post-Status Kosovo: Selected Institutional and 
Procedural Concerns” [2010] 35 Review of Central and East European Law 129; 
Fisnik Korenica, Dren Doli, “Kosovar Constitutional Court's Jurisdiction: Searching 
for Strengths and Weaknesses” [2010] 11 German Law Journal 803. Steve Hill, Paul 
Linden-Retek, “Supervised Independence and Post-Conflict Sovereignty: The 
Dynamics of Hybridity in Kosovo’s New Constitutional Court” [2011] 36 Yale 
Journal of International Law Online 26. 
43The President of the Republic proposed to the Assembly an additional paragraph to 
Article 27 of the Law on Pension of KSF members, as follows: “In case of lack of 
public funds, the Government may downsize the benefits from the law, in order it 
does not endanger financial security of Kosovo.” 
44 President Jahjaga v Assembly of Kosovo [2012] KO 57/12 1 (CC) para 10. 
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any of its specific provisions.”45 The Court ruled that it cannot. According to 
the Constitutional Court nowhere does the Constitution provide that the 
President is entitled to propose concrete amendments in the law pending 
promulgation.46 The Constitutional Court went on saying that the President is 
entitled to propose legislation based on Article 79 of the Constitution and 
Articles 53 para. 1 and 54 of the Rules of the Assembly.47 Because the 
President did not exercise that authority, but instead used the competence 
under Article 84 para. 6 for returning the Law for reconsideration, the referral 
back to the Assembly was invalid, and the Assembly never had a proper 
return before it – concluded the Constitutional Court.48 This Constitutional 
Court decision has set an important standard in the constitutional relationship 
between the Assembly and the President in the process of a review of 
legislation prior to promulgation by barring the President from proposing 
amendments to the law that is subject of presidential review. The 
Constitutional Court has rightfully echoed the position that neither the 
Constitution nor Rules of Procedure of the Assembly have authorised the 
President to suggest concrete amendments in a law that is returned to the 
Assembly for reconsideration. If the President would have enjoyed the right to 
suggest concrete amendments in a law that is approved by the Assembly, it 
would have certainly distorted the system of constitutional balances in the 
context of legal drafting process in Kosovo. Therefore, in line with the 
reasoning of the Constitutional Court decision, it appears to be sufficient for 
the President to only veto a law and send it back to the Assembly with a letter 
outlining the reasons for its rejection.  
  
5. THE USE OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: CHALLENGES AND 
CONSTRAINTS  
 
The powers of the President to return a law for reconsideration are broad 
but not unlimited from constitutional point of view. Article 84 para. 6 of the 
Constitution enable the President to return adopted laws for re-consideration, 
“when he/she considers them to be harmful to the legitimate interests of the 
Republic of Kosovo or one or more Communities.”49 Although the language 
provided in Article 84 para. 6 is broad leaving ample room for interpretation, 
45 President Jahjaga v Assembly of Kosovo [2012] KO 57/12 1 (CC) para 37. 
46 President Jahjaga v Assembly of Kosovo [2012] KO 57/12 1 (CC) para 61. 
47 Article 79 of the Kosovo Constitution provides: The initiative to propose laws may 
be taken by the President of the Republic of Kosovo from his/her scope of authority, 
the Government, deputies of the Assembly or at least ten thousand citizens as 
provided by law. 
48 President Jahjaga v Assembly of Kosovo [2012] KO 57/12 1 (CC) para 61. 
49 Constitution (n 1) art 86. 
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the Constitution has boldly underlined two constitutional areas based on 
which the exercise of the President’s legislative veto can be made. The 
President is therefore bound to reflect along the categories that are implicit in 
Article 84 para. 6 of the Constitution. It is worth to mention that some 
constitutions provide no guidance with regard the scope of the presidential 
review of legislation prior to its promulgation.50 According to the French 
Constitution, the President of the Republic promulgates acts of parliament 
within a period of 15 days following their final adoption and transmission to 
the government. But the President “may, before the expiration of this time 
limit, ask parliament to reconsider the act, or some of its articles. This 
reconsideration may not be refused.”51 Similar constitutional grounds for the 
return of law for parliamentary reconsideration are provided by the Basic Law 
of the Federal Republic of Germany according to which “laws enacted in 
accordance with the provisions of this Basic Law shall, after countersignature, 
be certified by the Federal President and promulgated in the Federal Law 
Gazette.”52 Despite enumeration of the grounds for refusal of legislation, the 
Kosovo Constitution has given the President a wide magnitude of reviewing 
powers to assess whether the enacted legislation threatens the legitimate 
interests of Kosovo or of one its communities. The qualification is made by 
the President and no other constitutional organ can make constitutional 
objections to the President’s decision in returning a law for reconsideration. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to demarcate the boundaries of the President’s 
veto powers when returning legislation for reconsideration. The exercise of 
the President’s legislative veto largely depends on the nature of the law, its 
content and the manner in which the law was adopted. It is unquestionable 
that the President ought to defend his/her constitutional competencies 
provided by the Constitution against potential parliamentary intrusions. 
Likewise, the President ought to temporarily block constitutionally deficient 
legislation, which threatens constitutional rights and freedoms or endangers 
constitutional principles such as the separation of powers, the rule of law or 
the principle of democracy.53 There are essentially two major constitutional 
grounds upon which the legislative veto can be exercised, which will be 
discussed in the following section of this article. 
 
 
 
 
50 Venice Commission Report (n 39). 
51 Constitution of France 1958 art 10. 
52 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany 1949 art 82. 
53 Broughton (n 29) 111. 
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Procedural review 
 
The manner in which the Assembly adopts laws, including the required 
majority for their adoption is regulated by the Constitution.54 There are 
generally three forms for approval of laws at the Assembly of Kosovo. The 
first and the most dominant variant is adoption of legislation by a simple 
majority vote.55 Certain laws, however, due to their relevance and complexity 
require a qualified majority of votes, including the approval of the deputies 
holding seats reserved or guaranteed for the Communities. This is related to 
the legislation of vital interest for Kosovo, for the approval of which the 
majority of the Assembly deputies present and voting and the majority of the 
Assembly deputies’ present and voting holding seats reserved or guaranteed 
for representatives of Communities that are not in the majority is required.56 
Finally, laws may be adopted by the absolute majority (which requires the 
majority vote of all deputies). For instance when the President returns an 
enacted law to Assembly for reconsideration, such law is approved by a 
majority vote of all its deputies.57 Until the Constitutional Court’s decision on 
the President’s legislative veto powers was issued, there has been some 
constitutional ambiguity concerning the manner in which the legislative veto 
was overridden. In a few instances legislation returned by the President was 
adopted based on a simple majority vote, which is in open contradiction with 
the Constitution. In some other cases, the Functional Committee proposal, but 
not the returned law as a whole, was put for voting at the plenary session, 
which is not what the Constitution dictates.58 This constitutional ambiguity 
has also been generated by the Rules of Procedure, which have not followed 
the language of the Constitution regarding the approval of the returned 
legislation by the President. Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure provides:  
54 Constitution (n 1) art 80. 
55Article 80 para 1 of the Kosovo Constitution provides that “laws, decisions and 
other acts are adopted by the Assembly by a majority vote of deputies present and 
voting, except when otherwise provided by the Constitution.” 
56Constitution (n 2) art 82. The laws that require double majority voting include the 
laws changing municipal boundaries, establishing or abolishing municipalities, 
defining the scope of powers of municipalities and their participation in inter 
municipal and cross-border relations; Laws implementing the rights of Communities 
and their members, Laws on the use of language; Laws on local elections; Laws on 
protection of cultural heritage; Laws on religious freedom or on agreements with 
religious communities; Laws on education; Laws on the use of symbols, including 
Community symbols and on public holidays. 
57 Constitution (n 1) art 80 para 4. 
58Minutes of the plenary session of the Assembly of Kosovo, P- 123 dated 27 July 
2010. 
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“If the President of the Republic returns the law for its review in the 
Assembly, the Presidency of the Assembly shall refer it immediately 
to the functional – lead committee for its review. Functional 
committee shall only review the issues contained in President’s 
decision. The Committee shall, within two working weeks from the 
day of receipt, present to the Assembly a report with 
recommendations. The Assembly shall with majority of votes of all 
members of the Assembly decide on approval of recommendations 
addressing the President’s remarks presented by the committee, 
which, together with the approved amendments, shall be considered as 
promulgated.” 
 
However, the Constitution suggests for a different constitutional 
arrangement than that provided by the Rules of Procedure on the manner in 
which the returned law is approved. The Constitution provides that on 
occasion of a return of a law by the President for reconsideration, the returned 
law must be approved by the majority of all the deputies of the Assembly. 
Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure is clearly in stark contradiction with 
Article 80 para. 4 of the Constitution. The following example illustrates the 
procedural errors that have come up in the process of dealing with the 
President’s legislative veto. On 20 April 2012, the Assembly adopted the 
Criminal Code of Kosovo (hereinafter “the Code”). Media and civil society 
representatives were concerned with the content of Articles 37, 38 and 39 of 
the Code that regulated criminal liability for criminal offences committed 
through media, and requested from the President to veto the Law, which the 
President did on 4 May 2012.59 The President refused to sign the Law on the 
grounds that the contested articles of the Code contradicted article 40 
(freedom of expression) and article 42 (freedom of media) of the Constitution. 
In addition, the President also invoked articles of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its 
Protocols, which by virtue of Article 22 of the Constitution is directly 
applicable.60 The President’s concerns were legitimate but unanticipated 
parliamentary developments prevented the Assembly from accommodating 
the Presidential constitutional objections in the Law. At its session of June 22, 
2012 the Assembly debated regarding the concerns raised in the decision of 
the President for removal of contested articles of the Code but failed to secure 
an absolute majority of 61 votes to accommodate the constitutional concerns 
raised by the President. It is important to note that the Assembly has not put 
59The contested articles of the Criminal Code of Kosovo dealt with the criminal 
liability of chief editors, publishers, printers or manufacturers, protecting sources of 
information and application of general provisions on criminal liability. 
60 Presidential Decree (2012) 561/1. 
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for voting the entire law as required by the Constitution but only the 
recommendation of the Functional Committee requesting removal of the 
article 37, 38 and 39 of the Criminal Code.61 The contested provisions of the 
Code were removed only after the Assembly adopted the Law on 
Amendments to the Criminal Code on 19 October 2012. In addressing the 
majority voting requirement required for overriding the Presidential 
legislative veto, the Constitutional Court recalled the constitutional 
requirement for the absolute majority as laid down by Article 84 para. 4 of the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court noted that “provided that the President 
of the Republic exercised the veto power … in order to overturn that 
Presidential veto, it would be necessary that at least 61 deputies vote in favour 
of the adopted law that was returned by the President of the Republic.”62 This 
was not the case in the course of the parliamentary voting of the returned 
Criminal Code. Hence, it becomes clear that the President enjoys the 
constitutional power to ensure that the procedural requirements for the law 
adoption [as laid down by the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the 
Assembly] are duly observed. If the President finds out that the Assembly has 
failed to adhere to the procedural requirements for adopting the law, it is the 
constitutional duty of the President not to sign a law and to return the law to 
the Assembly and have the law enactment procedures repeated. 
 
Substantive review  
 
In the following part of this article we address the substantive grounds for 
review of laws before their promulgation by the President, including the 
parameters of this review. As noted earlier, the scope of the President’s power 
to determine constitutionally objectionable laws is broad. This is a result of 
the far-reaching wording that has been employed at the Constitution, which 
gives the President abundant authority to negate enacted-legislation. In broad 
outline, the Constitution provides for two avenues for a review of legislation 
prior to its promulgation. The first avenue is to assess whether the enacted-
law constitutes a threat for the legitimate interests of the state. It is of course 
obvious that what constitutes a threat for the state interest is difficult to 
quantify. It all depends on the nature and the level of such threat, and whether 
the use of the legislative veto is prudent and proportional to achieving its goal 
i.e. preventing the parliamentary majority from passing constitutionally 
objectionable legislation. The second avenue of Presidential legislative review 
powers is verifying whether the enacted law adversely affects any of the vital 
interests of the communities as provided by the Constitution. In this regard 
61 KDI, ‘Minutes of the Assembly Session’ (www.votaime.org 2012) 
<http://www.votaime.org/transkriptet/Qershor/22062012.pdf> accessed 25 July 2014.  
62 President Jahjaga v Assembly of Kosovo [2012] KO 57/12 1 (CC) Para 76. 
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one should recall that the Constitution has devoted an entire chapter for the 
protection of the rights and interest of the Communities. Members of the 
communities have been given extra-constitutional rights in addition to those 
contemplated by Chapter 2 of the Constitution.63 Moreover, the Constitution 
provides that state authorities are obliged to respect the standards provided in 
the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and 
it establishes the Consultative Council for Communities, which acts under the 
authority of the President of the Republic of Kosovo in which all 
Communities are represented.64 The President therefore enjoys broad 
legislative review powers when receiving legislation for promulgation. 
However, a critical reading of the Constitution seem to suggest that the 
President should demonstrate reasonable care in preserving the integrity of the 
legislative process when reviewing laws passed by the Assembly as noted at 
the Constitutional Court’s decision. In this sense as long as legislative veto is 
exercised within the contemplated constitutional framework i.e. when there is 
a substantial violation of state interests or the separation of powers to the 
detriment of any of the branches of the government, the use of the legislative 
veto is constitutionally justifiable. The uncertainty may only arise when the 
President acts beyond the contemplated constitutional boundaries where the 
legislative veto is used as Professor Broughton calls it a “policy-making 
device for dictating the content of national legislation.”65 And, while 
demarcation of the scope of the Presidential review powers implicit in article 
84 para. 6 of the Constitution is difficult, there seem to be some orientating 
benchmarks, which could serve as a useful guide for determining whether the 
enacted legislation is consistent with constitutional requirements, which we 
will be briefly elaborate in the following section of this article. 
 
The Supremacy Clause 
 
It should be noted that the power of the President to defend the 
Constitution and to reject promulgation of constitutionally objectionable laws 
is unquestionable. As Professor Johnsen has written, the President can bring 
“a valuable perspective to the debate over the Constitution’s meaning.”66 
According to the constitutional supremacy clause it is the duty of the 
President to refuse to sign any statute with constitutional defects and to notify 
63 Constitution (n 1) art 57 para 1. 
64 Constitution (n 1) art 60. 
65 Broughton (n 29) 133. 
66 Dawn Johnsen, “The Constitution under Clinton: A critical assessment: Presidential 
Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes” [2000] 63 Law & 
Contemp. Prob. 7, 36. 
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the Assembly of his constitutional objections. In Kosovo the Constitution 
enjoys the status of the highest legal act whereby every law and other legal 
acts must be in compliance with it.67 Therefore, it is the duty of the President 
to deter any legislation which in his view is unconstitutional. Judge Frank 
Easterbrook rightfully argues the power to safeguard the constitution is the 
duty of every branch power. According to Easterbrook “no law may go into 
force unless all three branches agree that it is constitutional. Each, acting 
within its sphere, has the power to say no: Congress not to enact, the President 
not to approve in his legislative role or enforce in his executive role, and the 
Court to set aside.”68 Such prerogative according to Madison enables the 
President to “restrain the Legislature from encroaching on the other co-
ordinate Departments, or on the rights of the people at large; or from passing 
laws unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their form.”69 The duty to 
protect the constitutional order is implicit in the oath text provided by the Law 
on the President which states 
 
“I swear to commit all my powers to the preservation of 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Republic of 
Kosovo, to ensure human and citizen rights and freedoms, to respect 
and protect the Constitution and the laws, to maintain peace and 
welfare of all citizens of Republic of Kosovo and to conduct all my 
duties with consciousness and responsibility.”70 
 
Invoking the constitutional supremacy clause has been the general 
practice in the exercise of the legislative veto in Kosovo. For example, when 
the current President of Kosovo returned the Criminal Code of Kosovo 
(adopted on 20 April 2012) for parliamentary reconsideration on the grounds 
that it contained articles that curtailed down freedom of media standards, it 
stated incompliance provisions of the Constitution.71 Recalling the supremacy 
of the Constitution the President stated that adoption of the Criminal Code 
would create such constitutional disturbances that would adversely impact the 
constitutional right on freedom of expression and media, including the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
67 Constitution (n 1) art 16. 
68 Michael Crabb, “The Executive Branch Shall Construe”: The Canon of 
Constitutional Avoidance and the Presidential Signing Statement” [2008] 56 Kan. L. 
Rev. 711, 725.  
69 Harold Krent, Presidential Powers (1st, New York University Press, 2005) 17. 
70 Law on the President 03/L-094 (2009). 
71 Constitution (n 1) art 40. 
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Freedoms and its Protocols, which by virtue of article 22 of the Constitution is 
directly applicable and has superiority over the laws of Kosovo.72 
 
The Separation of powers 
 
In one of the presidential objections the President underlined the 
importance of protection the separation of powers and the concept of 
constitutionally implied powers. This actually was one of the rarest cases 
when the President used the legislative return powers to protect the 
independent presidential constitutional powers against in what the President 
portrayed as the tendency of the Assembly to amputate presidential 
competencies contemplated by the Constitution and allocate them 
unconstitutionally within the Assembly portfolio. Here are the facts of the 
case. On 12 July 2010, the Assembly adopted the Law no. 03/L-209 on 
Central Bank Authority (“Law on CBA”). Following its enactment, the Law 
on CBA was sent to the President for promulgation. The President refused to 
sign the Law on the grounds that it contained provisions related to the 
appointment and removal of a Governor or any non-executive member of the 
Central Bank Board (CBB) that were contrary to the Constitution. The 
Constitution unequivocally provides that the President “appoints the Governor 
of the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo who will also act as its 
Managing Director, and appoints the other members of the Bank’s Board.”73 
This competency falls under the independent constitutional competencies of 
the President whose exercise is not dependent on authority of the other 
constitutional organ based on the principle of checks and balances.  
However, the Law on CBA provided a system for the appointment and 
removal of the Central Bank Board different from that of the Constitution. 
The Law on CBA authorized the Assembly to conduct the initial selection of 
the candidates for the Central Bank Board, and forward the proposed 
candidates to the President for endorsement. With regard to dismissal, the 
Law gave the Assembly the authority to initially decide for dismissal of a 
Governor or non-executive members of the Central Bank Board, a decision 
which would then be sent to the President for approval.74 However, art. 41 
para 3 of the vetoed Law provided that if the President does not act on the 
Assembly proposed measure of dismissal within 15 days, the decision of the 
Assembly will enter into force. It should be recalled that competencies of the 
72 President’s Decree 556/01 2012 
73 Constitution (n 1) art 84 para 27. 
74 Law No.03/L –209 on Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo. Article 41 
regulated the disqualification and removal from the Central Bank Board. Law entered 
into force after having been returned for parliamentary reconsideration and voted by 
the AoK on 27 July 2010. 
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Assembly are contemplated in Article 65 of the Constitution, and nowhere 
does the Constitution vests the Assembly with authority to propose to the 
President candidates for appointment at the CBB. Departing from this 
constitutional ground, the President refused to sign the Law on CBA arguing 
that the Law violated the apportionment of constitutional competencies 
provided by the Constitution and violated the principle of the separation of 
powers that is inherent in the Constitution. In President’s understanding, 
enactment of the Law on CBA was a blatant invasion by the Assembly of the 
constitutionally-independent prerogatives of the President on the appointment 
of a Governor another members of the CBB. The President argued that 
promulgation of the Law would seriously jeopardise the legitimate interests of 
Kosovo and would prevent the President from fulfilling his constitutional duty 
as a guarantor of the constitutional functioning of state institutions. On 27 
July 2010, the Assembly decided with absolute majority to accept the 
President’s proposal and modify article 43 para 1. of the Law that provided 
for the entry into force of the Assembly decision on dismissal in case the 
President fails to endorse the proposal within 15 days.75 Surprisingly, the 
Assembly voted only the President’s concrete recommendation stated at the 
Decree but not the returned Law on CBA as required by the Constitution. In 
an attempt to accommodate the President’s constitutional objections, the 
Assembly only inserted a paragraph providing that “the President can approve 
or not approve the Assembly proposal for dismissal of the Governor or any 
member of the Central Bank Board of Kosovo.” However, despite the 
approval of the Presidential return statement, the assumed responsibilities of 
the Assembly on appointments or dismissals at the Central Bank Authority 
could not be fully justified on constitutional grounds.  
 
International Law 
 
The Constitution of Kosovo offers another avenue of the Presidential 
review of laws adopted by the Assembly: compliance with international law. 
Therefore a few words about the status of the international law in the Kosovo 
Constitution are important to be mentioned here. The Constitution pursues a 
friendly approach towards international law. The Constitution not only 
contemplates the primacy of the international law versus ordinary legislation 
but it also gives direct effect in terms of application to some of the most 
important international human rights instruments enumerated in Article 22 of 
the Constitution. Hence, the Constitution’s approach in Kosovo seems to 
correspond to the doctrine of monism whereby norms of international law are 
considered an integral part of the national legal system. This is clearly 
75 The official transcript on the Plenary Session of the Assembly of Kosovo, dated 27 
July 2010, is available at the official site of the Assembly of Kosovo. 
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provided in Article 19 of the Constitution which states that “ratified 
international agreements become part of the internal legal system after their 
publication in the Official Gazette in Kosovo” and become directly applicable 
“except for cases when they are not self-applicable and the application 
requires the promulgation of a law.”76 This primacy and direct applicability of 
international law in the Kosovo legal system is considered by some 
international law scholars as a “highly progressive approach to international 
law.”77  
The Constitution further provides that main international human rights 
instruments, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and its Protocols, are directly 
applicable “and, in the case of conflict, have priority over provisions of laws 
and other acts of public institutions.”78 That said, it is perfectly adequate for 
the President to extend the scope of presidential review by taking into account 
the requirements of the applicable international law with the enacted 
legislation. For this purpose the President has recently shown special 
consideration towards reliance on international law in legislative veto 
practices. One recent example is the decision to return the Criminal Code for 
reconsideration where the President has invoked provisions of the ECHR in 
76 Constitution (n 1) art 19 para 1. See Williman Slomanson, Fundamental 
perspectives on international law (Cengage Learning, 2010) 17.  
77 See Gideon Boas, Public international law: contemporary principles and 
perspectives (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012) p 153. See also Visar Morina, Fisnik 
Korenica, and Dren Doli. “The relationship between international law and national 
law in the case of Kosovo: A constitutional perspective.” [2011] International journal 
of constitutional law 274. See also Armin Von Bogdandy “Pluralism, direct effect, 
and the ultimate say: On the relationship between international and domestic 
constitutional law.” [2008] International Journal of Constitutional Law (2008) 397. 
78 Constitution (n 1) art 22. Providing for the direct applicability of international 
agreements and instruments the Constitution in its Article 22 provides that ‘Human 
rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the following international 
agreements and instruments are guaranteed by this Constitution, are directly 
applicable in the Republic of Kosovo and, in the case of conflict, have priority over 
provisions of laws and other acts of public institutions: (1) Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; (2) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols; (3) International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and its Protocols; (4) Council of Europe Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities; (5) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination; (6) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women; (7) Convention on the Rights of the Child; (8) 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. 
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the same degree with provisions of the Constitution.79 Not only that it is 
convenient for the President to check the enacted legislation based on the 
international law, but according to Article 53 of the Constitution any 
interpretation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms that are 
guaranteed by the Constitution must be done in the manner that is “consistent 
with the court decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.” The 
President is therefore obligated that in the course of reviewing legislation 
enacted by the Assembly to ensure that the norms of ratified international 
agreements or of those international human rights instruments that are directly 
applicable are not violated. It is for this reason that the tendency to uphold 
international law in reviewing legislation prior to its promulgation in Kosovo 
is increasing. Reliance on international law and particularly on the ECHR is 
evident for the legislation affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
As noted earlier the ECHR enjoys a legal status that is higher than the 
ordinary legislation, and the Constitutional Court of Kosovo has repeatedly 
reminded state institutions that observance of the ECHR and its jurisprudence 
on matters involving human rights interpretations is of an immense 
importance.80  
 
Decisions of the Constitutional Court 
 
The interesting aspect concerning the use of the Presidential powers in the 
area of law review is not whether the President has the power to interpret the 
enacted law for compatibility with the Constitution but whether the President 
can veto legislation based on constitutional understandings that contradict 
understandings implicit in prior Constitutional Court judgments? In other 
words the question is whether the President is obliged to follow 
constitutionally conforming interpretations made by the Kosovo 
Constitutional Court in the course of the review of laws enacted by the 
Assembly? In light of these questions it is worth noting that Kosovo has opted 
for a centralized version of constitutional review where the authority to 
resolve a constitutional controversy is vested with the Constitutional Court 
whose judgments are obligatory to all and have the force of law. Article 116 
para. 1 of the Constitution provides that “decisions of the Constitutional Court 
are binding on the judiciary and all persons and institutions of the Republic of 
79 President's Decree 556/01 2012. 
80 See for example Gëzim and Makfire Kastrati against Municipal Court in Prishtina 
and Kosovo Judicial Council [2012] KI 41/12 (CC); Valon Bislimi v Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, Kosovo Judicial Council and Ministry of Justice [2010] KI 06/10 
(CC); Imer Ibrahimi and 48 Other Former Employees of the Kosovo Energy 
Corporation v 49 Individual Judgments of the Supreme Court of the Republic of 
Kosovo [2010] KI 40/09 (CC). 
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Kosovo.” This means that respect and adherence to the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court is constitutionally imperative for every public institution 
including the President when acting as a law promulgator. Moreover, the 
legislation in Kosovo has introduced some further limitations to the President 
when an adopted law gets challenged for its constitutionality prior to its 
promulgation. According to the Kosovo Constitution “ten (10) or more 
deputies of the Assembly of Kosovo, within eight (8) days from the date of 
adoption, have the right to contest the constitutionality of any law or decision 
adopted by the Assembly as regards its substance and the procedure 
followed.”81 The Law on the Constitutional Court provides that the law 
adopted by the Assembly can be sent to the President for promulgation after 
the expiry of the deadline provided in Article 113 para. 5 of the Constitution. 
But in the event that a law adopted by the Assembly is contested on the 
grounds of constitutionality, the law is sent to the President of the Republic of 
Kosovo for promulgation “in accordance with modalities determined in the 
final decision of the Constitutional Court.”82 The Constitutional Court 
recently warned the President not to promulgate the Law on Amnesty, which 
was contested on the grounds of constitutionality within 8 days since its 
enactment.83 In its press release the Constitutional Court has reminded the 
constitutional organs that “any attempt to publish the Law or to apply it is 
unconstitutional and such an act is null and void.”84 Until the time of writing, 
the Constitutional Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of the 
Amnesty Law.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has sought to define the way in which the presidential 
legislative veto is exercised in Kosovo by taking into account the procedural 
and substantive factors that are inherent in the course of the legislative review 
process. By focusing on the Kosovan sources of constitutional law, including 
its national constitutional jurisprudence, the article has attempted to 
deconstruct the meaning and parameters of the President’s legislative veto 
powers in a parliamentary-type government. Six years after the adoption of 
81 Constitution (n 1) art 113 para 5. 
82 Law on the Constitutional Court 2008 art 43. 
83 The Law on Amnesty was contested by the Assembly members from the political 
movement “Vetvendosja” claiming that the Law infringed human rights and 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, including the International 
Covenant for the Civil and Political Rights that is directly applicable in Kosovo under 
Article 22 of the Constitution.  
84 Constitutional Court Press Release, dated 25 July 2013 accessible at http://gjk-
ks.org/?cid=2,28,344.  
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the Kosovo Constitution, the application of the Presidential legislative veto to 
refrain the Assembly from passing constitutionally deficient legislation has 
encountered many challenges. In some cases, this was a result of the 
constitutionally ambiguous norms while in other cases this may be related to 
the lack of understanding of the current legislative complexities. As the above 
mentioned developments in post-status Kosovo have unfolded, establishment 
of a well-structured constitutional dialogue in dealing with Presidential return 
statements both at procedural or substantive grounds has proven to be a 
difficult undertaking. The lack of a constitutionally-consistent approach for 
overturning the Presidential legislative veto is one the clear examples of the 
challenges that have confronted the application of the legislative veto in 
Kosovo. Such situation rendered the involvement of the Constitutional Court 
necessary, which in its 2012 interpretative decision tended to define the 
procedural dimension of the legislative veto. There is no doubt that 
constructive improvement of the legislative products is an essential 
requirement for a rule of law what makes the presidential legislative veto 
highly important. However, as Professor Spitzer has emphasised commenting 
the strategic use of the presidential veto in the United States of America even 
the veto threat often accomplishes “the purpose of an actual veto”.85 In the 
case it does not, its use to appeal to the public could also be an effective 
instrument to refrain the legislators from passing unconstitutional legislation. 
This is a valid point that deserves consideration in the constitutional landscape 
of Kosovo for as long as the legislative veto is exercised with prudence and 
pragmatism in order to safeguard the separation of powers being firmly 
embedded in our Constitution. 
85 Robert Spitzer, “Why Obama Must Embrace the Veto Strategy” 
(http://www.huffingtonpost.com 2011) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-j-
spitzer/time-for-an-obama-veto-st_b_803359.html> accessed 25 July 2014. 
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